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Abstract
Over the past 30 years, the inﬂuence of economics over the study of
environmental law and policy has expanded considerably, becoming
in the process the predominant framework for analyzing regulations
that address pollution, natural resource use, and other environmental
issues. This review seeks to complement the expansion of economic
reasoning and methodology within the ﬁeld of environmental law and
policy by identifying insights to be gleaned from various “nondismal”
social sciences. In particular, three areas of inquiry are highlighted as
illustrative of interdisciplinary work that might help to complement
law and economics and, in some cases, compensate for it: the study
of how human individuals perceive, judge, and decide; the observation
and interpretation of how knowledge schemes are created, used, and
regulated; and the analysis of how states and other actors coordinate
through international and global regulatory regimes. The hope is to
provide some examples of how environmental law and policy research
can be improved by deeper and more diverse engagement with social
science.
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INTRODUCTION
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Human beings seek meaning in the world
around them (Frankl 1946). They look for
purpose in their personal lives, in their work,
and in the broader society in which they live.
In a democratic society, law thus reﬂects not
only material needs and interests but also
a collective quest for meaning and purpose
(Rubin 2002). Regulation of environmental
quality is no exception, having arisen primarily
from the environmental movement of the late
1960s and early 1970s, which itself was associated with larger societal value shifts (Lazarus
2004). During the ensuing decades, efforts to
understand and regulate environmental quality
ultimately—and perhaps inevitably—matured
into a technocratic blend of science, economics,
and politics. Issues ranging from the preservation of endangered species to the management
of freshwater resources to the stabilization of
the planetary climate system are now routinely
analyzed through the technical lenses of risk assessment and welfare economic policy analysis
(for reviews, see Brooks et al. 2009, Revesz &
Stavins 2004). Nevertheless, at its core, the extant system of environmental law still reﬂects
a collective expression about what kind of society the public wants; as such, it is not merely
a technical apparatus for promoting preexisting wants, as the welfare economic approach to
policy analysis typically presumes.
In this review, we argue that the study
of environmental law and policy should be
broadly inclusive of social scientiﬁc insights.
Fields such as cognitive and social psychology,
science and technology studies, history and
philosophy of science, international relations
theory, and global governance studies all offer
valuable approaches to understanding and
shaping environmental law. In important respects, these “nondismal” social sciences serve
to compensate for aspects of the welfare economic framework that critics have found to be
descriptively or normatively lacking. Although
the welfare economic framework offers valuable
systematic information regarding the expected
consequences of policy proposals, it neverthe184
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less misses a great deal about how problems
get deﬁned and framed in the ﬁrst place, how
people understand those problems given their
predispositions and underlying cultural commitments, and how attempted policy solutions
to those problems must emerge from and
interact with multiple sources of governance.
Experts, citizens, and governments operate
within a context of social meaning that helps
to shape thought and motivate behavior. Close
attention to that context and its consequences
should be a central feature of the interdisciplinary study of environmental law and policy.
For instance, over the past several decades,
research in cognitive and social psychology
has elaborated a model of human perception,
choice, and behavior that is more richly
contoured and more realistic than the economic paradigm’s rational actor model. For
environmental law, this thicker and more
accurate account of the human actor helps to
better predict behavioral responses to policies;
to illuminate how individuals conceive of
and value the environment and risks to their
well-being; and to identify psychological and
cultural features among citizens and government ofﬁcials that complicate the adoption,
implementation, or even identiﬁcation of
economically “optimal” policy solutions.
Similarly, ﬁelds such as science and technology studies and the history and philosophy of science provide powerful lenses through
which to examine how scientiﬁc and technical
knowledge practices shape and inform particular legal and regulatory approaches. Whereas
the welfare economic paradigm typically takes
the empirical basis for policymaking as given
(or only awkwardly addresses it through the
economics of information), ﬁelds such as science and technology studies focus keenly on
the manner in which actors go about promoting, organizing, regulating, and reacting to the
generation of knowledge. Such epistemological
self-reﬂection is essential for managing twentyﬁrst century environmental, health, and safety
threats by providing a more realistic and reﬂexive appreciation for what we know and how we
know it.
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Finally, work in political science and other
ﬁelds helps to remedy the absence in the conventional policy paradigm of a detailed account
of how governments go about coordinating policy responses to global environmental problems. Both through traditional international
relations theory and through the burgeoning
literature on new governance approaches to
global regulation, political science offers valuable insight into the processes and institutions
by which transboundary and global environmental problems become subjects of political
activity and management efforts. Because so
many environmental problems now are recognized as having signiﬁcant supranational drivers
and repercussions—and because soon nearly all
environmental problems will be seen as deeply
intertwined with the ultimate global problem of
climate change—any account of environmental
law that lacks traction in the international and
transnational contexts is inadequate.
These three areas of social scientiﬁc
inquiry—human cognition and decision making, knowledge production and management,
and global governance—are merely illustrative
of the kinds of intellectual and empirical gains
to be had from expanding interdisciplinary
work beyond law and economics. Other areas
could easily have been chosen, such as the
application of organizational behavior theory,
new institutional economics, and related
approaches to corporate actors in an effort to
understand when and why regulatory compliance occurs (Gunningham et al. 2003, Macey
2010), or the use of sociological and cultural
anthropological methods to understand communal dimensions of environmental issues,
such as why some communities organize to
resist environmental nuisances, whereas others
do not (Crowfoot & Wondolleck 1990), or how
social solidarity can unravel in the aftermath
of environmental disasters (Bowler et al. 1994,
Gunderson 2010), or the importance of the
interpretive social sciences writ large in understanding how climate change disrupts prior
conceptions of identity and community and
in offering new frameworks for reintegrating
global facts with local values ( Jasanoff 2010,

p. 249). Although space limitations prevent
us from casting this wider net here, we hope
that the waters will appear worthy of further
exploration based on the examples we provide.

HUMAN COGNITION AND
DECISION MAKING
While the connection between environmental
regulation and economics is apparent, a tight
connection between environmental law and
research on human cognition also exists. For
decades, psychologists have shown that how
people think affects how they assess risk (Slovic
2001b). Of particular consequence to environmental law is the observation that experts
and lay people assess environmental risks
differently and, consequently, they disagree as
to what constitutes a signiﬁcant environmental
risk (Margolis 1994). Although the disparity
between expert and lay judgment is widely
recognized, its meaning is contentious. Some
contend that expert judgment should dominate
regulatory efforts (Sunstein 2000). Others
assert that ordinary human judgment reﬂects
an underlying wisdom or a deeper rationality
that regulatory efforts should track (Gigerenzer
2008, Kenrick et al. 2009). In recent years,
Kahan and his colleagues have developed a
third line of research, suggesting that this
disagreement arises from different cultural and
political commitments (Kahan 2007). Under
this view, people adopt cognitive strategies to
assess environmental risks that reﬂect their
views about what constitutes a just and meaningful society. These three positions can be
thought of as embracing technocratic, populist,
and cultural approaches to understanding the
cognitive processes that underlie demand for
environmental regulation. Together, they map
various strategies for how to think about how
people think about environmental risk, marking out a domain of research that is obviously
fundamental to environmental law and policy.
The technocratic approach to risk perception stresses the primacy of expert judgment.
For the technocrats, the key fact is not so much
the mismatch between expert and lay judgment
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as the mismatch between lay judgment and actuarial risks (Slovic et al. 2001a). In an early
study of lay assessment of environmental risks,
for example, Slovic and his colleagues asked
adults to identify the number of people in the
United States who died each year from several
causes (Slovic et al. 2001b). Not surprisingly,
people did not display a good working knowledge of likely causes of death. More importantly, their estimates revealed a clear pattern
of errors. Survey participants overestimated uncommon but dramatic causes of death, such
as death from venomous animal bites, but underestimated common causes of death, such as
death from heart failure. These results suggest
that salience and emotional impact, more so
than actual risk, dominate lay risk assessments.
For the technocrats, the prime suspect causing this mismatch in judgment is a widespread
reliance on a simple mental process known as
availability (Slovic et al. 2001a). According to
psychologists, people tend to approach complex
problems such as risk regulation using simple
ways of thinking, known as heuristics (Tversky
& Kahneman 1974). When people estimate the
prevalence of an occurrence, for example, they
assess how easy it is to call to mind instances
of the occurrence (Tversky & Kahneman
1974). Psychologists call this particular mental
shortcut the availability heuristic. In an early
demonstration of the phenomenon, Tversky &
Kahneman (1974) asked subjects to read lists of
male and female names, and then asked whether
male or female names were more prevalent on
the lists. In one version of the list, the male
names were celebrities, and in another version,
the female names were celebrities. Even though
the lists contained equal numbers of male and
female names, the subjects guessed that there
were more male names when the male names
were celebrities (and hence easier to recall) and
more female names when the female names
were celebrities (and hence easier to recall).
Researchers have demonstrated that excessive reliance on the availability heuristic can
induce people to draw conclusions that are
inconsistent with logic. In one study, people estimated that the text in a passage they just read
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contained more words ending with “ing” than
with “n” in the penultimate position (Tversky
& Kahneman 1983). Because the full gerund
form “ing” provides a better mnemonic cue
than having “n” in the penultimate position,
people can think of instances of the gerund
form more easily, and hence assume that there
are more of these kinds of words. In effect,
people rely on the availability heuristic and
their intuitive sense of prevalence, rather than
treating the problem as a question of logic.
Similarly, most people guess that there are
more words in the English language that begin
with the letter “k” than have “k” in the third
position—even though there are far more of
the latter (Tversky & Kahneman 1974).
For the technocrats, the availability heuristic has important implications for risk regulation. As the survey by Slovic and colleagues
(2001a) suggests, it arguably explains much of
the discrepancies between experts and lay people. Events that are easily recalled because of
their emotional content, visual appeal, or extensive media coverage do not necessarily pose the
most serious risks to society from an actuarial
perspective. Indeed, pallid, ordinary events that
draw little attention, such as automobile driving, might do so. Widespread reliance on the
availability heuristic also leaves lay judgment
vulnerable to manipulation (Kuran & Sunstein
1999). Politicians or others with good access to
media outlets might work to make some events
highly salient in ways that serve their own ends,
rather than the public interest. Portraying an
environmental hazard in a particularly vivid or
emotional fashion might induce an availability
cascade in which regulation becomes inevitable,
whether it is truly needed or not.
Thus, under the view that reliance on the
availability heuristic explains the discrepancy
between experts and lay persons, the experts
would seem to have the better approach
to risk assessment. Moreover, availability
is not the public’s only difﬁculty with risk
perception that worries technocrats. Research
suggests that people ignore other important
aspects of risk, such as the beneﬁts associated
with the underlying risky activity (Fischhoff
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et al. 2001a), and can completely ignore the
probability of occurrence in some instances
(Reyna & Brainerd 2008). Laypersons also
react far more strongly to potential increases
in risk than they react favorably to identical
potential decreases in risk (William & Viscusi
1991). Experts have access to actuarial evidence
concerning risk, whereas lay people tend to rely
on their intuition, guided by the potentially
misleading availability heuristic. Lay people
let their intuition and emotion guide their
concerns about the environment, rather than
statistics (Finucane et al. 2001). Targeting the
lay public’s environmental fears and ignoring
experts could thus mean, at one extreme,
neglecting real risks that could be addressed
in a cost-effective fashion and, at the other
extreme, adopting excessive regulations against
risks that are not apt to cause much harm.
For the technocrats, the primary problem
with lay judgment lies with an excessive
reliance on the wrong heuristics. In identifying
a widespread reliance on mental shortcuts,
Tversky & Kahneman (1974) argued that
heuristics are useful but prone to being used
in the wrong settings, thereby producing
judgment that is inconsistent with rationality.
Using availability instead of deductive logic to
answer the question as to whether a passage
has more words ending in “ing” or with the
letter “n” in the penultimate position is a key
example in which people commonly use an
inappropriate mental strategy. More recently,
Kahneman (2011) has argued that people
generally rely on two systems of reasoning in
making decisions—an intuitive system that is
dominated by heuristics and emotion and a
rational system that produces judgments that
are largely consistent with rational choice. For
the technocrats, experts rely on the deliberative
system, whereas lay judgment is too often the
product of the intuitive system.
Populists reject the technocratic position.
They attack the idea that widespread reliance
on heuristics leads to errors, arguing instead
that heuristics are precisely what make people
smart (Gigerenzer et al. 1999). Populists assert
that what seem like mental shortcuts are really

expressions of deeper levels of rationality
(Kenrick et al. 2009). In effect, they contend
that the actuarial approach that experts use to
assess risk is too narrow and fails to capture
important values that lay people express
through their reaction to environmental risk.
While technocrats contend that the research
on judgment and choice shows that people rely
on heuristics excessively, populists interpret
the results differently. Populists agree that
these kinds of studies demonstrate reliance on
heuristics, but they contend that the studies do
not show that reliance on heuristics produces
bad judgment. Populists complain that the
questions commonly used in this research are
deliberately designed to induce people to rely
on inappropriate heuristics (Gigerenzer 1993).
People normally do not encounter lists of words
that are stacked in such a way as to mislead what
would otherwise be a fairly reliable mechanism
for assessing frequency. Furthermore, populists assert that people do not rely on the same
heuristics in all settings and avoid relying on
heuristics when the environment signals that
they would be inappropriate to use (Gigerenzer
2000). The populists thus embrace what they
term ecological rationality (Gigerenzer
et al. 1999). That is, people embrace the right
mental shortcut for the right setting.
For example, in a recent study, Marewski &
Schooler (2011) showed that people select carefully from among competing heuristics. In their
study, people rely on the recognition heuristic
to answer questions concerning which of two
cities are largest or which have international airports. But when both cities are well known (as
measured by internet references), people abandon the heuristic in favor of alternative strategies that rely on other knowledge they hold
about the cities. The result is a nuanced approach to decision making that takes advantage
of properties of the decision-making environment. When the recognition heuristic would
work well, people rely on it, but when the environment disfavors the heuristic, people change
strategies.
But if people are thinking intelligently
about risk perception in this fashion, then what
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explains the results of surveys showing that lay
people’s risk assessments do not track actuarial
risk assessments? The populists assert that the
survey results are overstated and that lay people
are actually thinking more deeply about risk
than experts. As to the ﬁrst response, populists
identify what they see as methodological ﬂaws
in the research (Hertwig et al. 2005). They
note that the subjects for surveys are often
college students, who face far lower immediate
risks of suffering from common ailments like
heart failure, diabetes, and cancer than the
general population. Because people’s estimates
of mortality statistics are heavily affected by
deaths in their peer groups, college students are
apt to overestimate risks that are more likely to
occur in their age group, such as deaths from
violence or automobile accidents. Estimates
based on such events do not really respond to
the researcher’s question about the population;
subjects are instead providing answers that are
more meaningful to them. They are expressing
their personal fears, whereas experts are actually addressing epidemiological issues. Hence,
although the survey participants fail to assess
the question of population mortality rates well,
they might be doing a fair job of assessing their
personal, short-term risks.
Furthermore, the skewed mortality estimates in these studies might reﬂect regression
to the mean (Hertwig et al. 2005). That is, the
subjects might know that they know little about
the true mortality rates, and moderate their
estimates away from numbers they perceive as
extremely low or extremely high. Moderation
of this sort is a sensible response to one’s
lack of knowledge, but it would produce an
underestimate of common causes of death
and overestimate of uncommon causes. This
account is more than just a methodological difﬁculty for a psychological research paradigm; it
suggests that the demand for regulation will be
far more rational than the technocrats suggest
because it indicates that people make appropriately modest assessments of environmental
risk. Taken together, the two populist reinterpretations of the survey disparities suggest that
risk assessment is both personal and cautious.
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Whereas technocrats portray the lay public as
a kind of unruly mob, clamoring for regulators
to respond to the latest new story, populists
see the lay public as concerned about risks in a
personal and moderated fashion.
Populist interpretations also suggest that lay
risk assessment is actually superior to expert assessment because the former incorporates values other than mere actuarial risk (Gigerenzer
& Brighton 2009). In fact, even technocrats
admit that a wide variety of factors other than
cognitive availability inﬂuence public risk perception (Fischhoff et al. 2001b). As described
above, some of these factors cannot be reconciled with a rational approach yet may still be
normatively signiﬁcant. For example, people
are far less tolerant of risks that they perceive to
arise from involuntary activities (such as exposure to air pollution or proximity to a hazardous
waste disposal facility) than ones that arise from
events they perceive to be within their control
(such as from smoking, skiing, or scuba diving)
(Fischhoff et al. 2001b). This discrepancy can
seem irrational, but it likely reﬂects the high
value people place on their autonomy. Factors
such as perceived naturalness, novelty, the
chronic nature of risk, whether the risk involves
a dreaded illness, whether the risk is wellunderstood by science, and whether the risk
imposes catastrophic consequences all affect
the public’s tolerance for risk (Fischhoff et al.
2001a). These factors reﬂect rational concerns
and are highly understandable. People obviously care about how they live, how they might
die, and who might be responsible for their
quality of life. A myopic focus on lives saved
would inappropriately ignore these issues.
Two factors that affect the public’s sense of
risk in particular demonstrate why ignoring the
public would be undemocratic and inappropriate: betrayal aversion and risk equity. First, it is
clear that people are averse to risks that involve
a perceived betrayal (Koehler & Gershoff
2002). In one study, researchers tested whether
subjects were averse to betrayal by a safety precaution (Koehler & Gershoff 2002). They asked
subjects whether they would prefer to purchase
an automobile in which they stood a 2% chance
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of dying if they had a serious trafﬁc accident or
one (at the same price) in which the presence
of an airbag reduced the fatality rate to 1%, but
which also presented an additional 1 in 1000
(0.01%) risk of a fatality due to another cause.
When researchers indicated that the other
cause was unrelated to the airbag, most subjects
expressed a preference for the safer car. But
when the researchers indicated that the extra
1 in 1000 risk was a direct consequence of the
safety precaution, the subjects mostly preferred
the more dangerous vehicle. Expressing that
choice would certainly make the subjects less
safe, on an actuarial basis, but people ﬁnd the
potential to be harmed by a safety precaution
to be strongly aversive. Although technocrats
identify such aversion as an irrational response
(Sunstein 2005), these researchers defend the
subjects’ choice as reasonable. The pain and
regret one might feel from opting into a safety
measure that then caused serious harm might
be worth avoiding, even at some increased level
of actuarial risk (Koehler & Gerhsoff 2005). At
the very least, betrayal aversion is not sensibly
ignored by regulators.
Similarly, ordinary people pay close attention to the equities associated with risks. To
see this, consider a hypothetical (described
by Hornstein 1992) in which a community of
one million people is considering one of three
ways to provide electricity: (a) a conventional
coal-ﬁred power plant that pollutes the air
in a way that poses a one-in-one-million risk
of injury due to illness to each person in the
community, (b) a novel biomass converter
that poses a one-in-ten-thousand risk to the
ten thousand people in the population who
suffer from asthma, and (c) a nuclear power
plant that poses a one-in-one-million risk of
a catastrophic failure that would kill everyone
in the community. Relying on actuarial risk
provides no clear choice, because the expected
harm in each scenario is identical. And yet people have preferences among these statistically
equivalent options. Most people reject option
b as unfair to a small number. Others dislike
the idea that the ﬁrst option will ultimately
inﬂict all of the harm upon a small number of

people (or likely one person). Still others worry
that preserving the community is important
and so will avoid the nuclear option with its
catastrophic potential. The important aspect of
the problem lies not with the answer, of course,
but with the reasoning process. Neglecting
these reasoning processes leaves important
concerns out of the risk calculation—a fact
that is missed or only imperfectly glimpsed by
the conventional risk assessment and welfare
economic approach to environmental law.
Expertise does not help resolve some
of the fundamental questions that underlie
environmental risk. Catastrophic risk should,
perhaps, be assessed differently than discrete
risks. Risks that a society imposes on a small
(perhaps historically underrepresented) minority group are not the same as risks shared
by all. Some risks seem like betrayals and can
undermine public trust. Risks that are imposed
in an involuntary fashion, involve dreaded or
stigmatized illnesses, or are novel can pose
important questions for a society to answer as
a society. Populists assert that the variations
in lay risk perception reﬂect these concerns.
Consequently, denigrating these concerns
because they do not directly replicate actuarial
measures of risk undermines democratic values.
Recent research on lay risk assessment
from cultural cognition researchers deepens the
problem of resolving tensions between expert
and lay judgment. If the disparity between expert and lay judgment involved only a deeper
rationality of lay judgment, the problem would
be tractable. Experts could quantify the variety of factors that affect lay judgment and make
adjustments to cost-beneﬁt calculations. Regulatory authorities could also assess, in a public and careful way, whether any of the factors
are ones that reﬂect deep rationality or instead
arise from simplistic or misleading thought processes that individuals themselves would reject
upon reﬂection. Although such a process could
be messy and cumbersome, it is not unimaginable. In fact, current regulatory efforts attempt
to reconcile some of these issues. For example, the US Environmental Protection Agency
has made efforts to address what has been called
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“environmental racism” in its licensing and regulatory decisions, so as to avoid imposing environmental risks disproportionally on disadvantaged communities (for a review, see Lazarus
2000).
Research on cultural cognition, however,
suggests that lay risk perception reﬂects the
cultural and political mindset of the decision
maker to such an extent that reliance on neutral
principles of environmental regulation may
be fundamentally impossible (Kahan 2007).
Cultural cognition researchers go beyond the
divide between expert and lay perception to
note that lay people do not agree among each
other as to which issues constitute serious
societal hazards. The very idea, in other words,
that there is a lay perception of risk masks
signiﬁcant, deeply ingrained differences in
cultural cognition. Thus, while some people
worry that global climate change threatens to
destroy our very civilization, others fail to see
any appreciable risk associated with climate
change (Kahan 2011). Individual differences,
moreover, appear to follow a predictable
pattern along political-cultural dimensions.
People who generally believe that individual
achievement is critical to societal ﬂourishing
and who also hold that governments cannot and
should not disturb existing social and political
hierarchies (so called individualist-hierarchs)
assess environmental risks such as climate
change radically differently from those who believe that governments exist principally to take
care of the poor and disenfranchised (so-called
communitarian-egalitarians) (Kahan 2011).
These groups differ markedly as to what constitutes important societal risks (Kahan 2007).
In effect, they do not merely incorporate some
additional factors in assessing the degree of risk
that various activities pose; they disagree fundamentally as to whether such risks even exist.
Because these beliefs are so tightly bound up in
cultural and political commitments, they resist
scientiﬁc insights and economic calculations.
The individualist-hierarchs derive selfesteem from taking care of themselves and
from any social status they hold (Kahan 2007).
For them, expansive governmental programs
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that supplant individual achievement or disrupt
existing status arrangements are not only misguided, they are also threatening. This outlook
is fundamentally inconsistent with the view that
a massive, global externality is emerging that
requires a major international initiative in response. Individualist-hierarchs believe in individual effort, not group achievement, and hence
struggle to accept the perspective in which
global climate change is a serious threat. Doing
so would undermine their place in society and
their understanding of how society should be
organized to promote human well-being.
The communitarian-egalitarians harbor
the mirror image set of concerns (Kahan
2007). They derive self-esteem from the belief
that they live in a just society that can work
together to solve problems that threaten their
community and to take care of those that are
less well off. Many environmental externalities
resonate well with this group, as addressing
pollution that comes from many sources generally requires collective action. They easily,
even uncritically, accept climate change as a
serious social problem because for them it is
emblematic of all that is wrong with an individualistic, capitalist form of societal governance.
For them, climate change is the product of
promoting the mindset that all members of
a society will be better off if they engage in selfserving pursuits. Communitarian-egalitarians
see climate change as only symptomatic of a
society that does not do enough to care for its
weak and fails to embrace a collective mindset
and sense of shared restraint. This mindset
helps to explain why many environmental
groups reject nuclear power as a response to
climate change. Even though nuclear power
has a vastly smaller carbon footprint than fossil
fuels, it is still the product of large, hierarchically run business organizations that work for
primarily private goals. For this group, esteem
arises from working together to establish social
norms of caring and trust, rather than from
allowing unfettered individualism to reign.
These kinds of political attitudes affect risk
assessment in ways that cannot be reconciled
through neutral scientiﬁc or economic analysis.
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The deep inﬂuence of cultural cognition can
perhaps best be seen in research that Kahan and
colleagues conducted on risk assessments associated with nanotechnology (Kahan et al. 2009).
Nanotechnology is a little understood subject
among lay persons; most people are unaware of
what it is or what risks it might pose. In their
survey of risk perceptions associated with nanotechnology, Kahan and colleagues found that
those who knew absolutely nothing about nanotechnology expressed no meaningful opinions
about its risks, but a little knowledge proved
to be a dangerous thing. People who knew
only a little about nanotechnology divided
markedly along political-cultural dimensions.
Individualist-hierarchs saw no danger from
nanotechnology and expressed concern that
government should be kept out of the business
of regulating it so as not to quash an important
nascent industry. Communitarian-egalitarians
worried that big business was hiding the
dangers of this novel technology, and that
government should move quickly to develop
regulations to address its risks. Knowledge
feeds, rather than ameliorates, the political
and cultural divides because people interpret
what they know in light of their worldviews (Rachlinski 2000). Everything that the
individualist-hierarchs feel they know about the
world has taught them that governmental regulation stiﬂes creativity, whereas everything that
the communitarian-egalitarians feel they know
teaches them that greedy corporations have to
be reined in so as to avoid inﬂicting environmental harm on unsuspecting communities.
The research on cultural cognition adds
a third understanding of the assessment of
environmental risk to those provided by the
technocrats and populists. The technocrats
blame cognitive availability and widespread reliance on anecdotes for lay misunderstanding
of risk. The cultural cognition research, however, demonstrates that different stories will
resonate with different populations. Even the
simplest stories of environmental risk are seen
differently by different camps. For example, to
communitarian-egalitarians, a news story in the
late-1960s about debris that caught ﬁre in the

Cuyahoga River near Cleveland was just the
tip of the iceberg of the destruction of our nations’ waterways by big business (Lazarus 2004).
For individualist-hierarchics, the story was an
oddity that environmentalists have overblown
in support of an unjustiﬁable, cost-ineffective
regulatory scheme that chokes individual initiative and economic growth (Adler 2002). Understanding that cognitive availability plays a
role in risk assessment is thus only part of the
story—we must also know what is available and
to whom (Sunstein 2003).
Similarly, the cultural cognition story adds
to populists’ account of risk assessment. Populists would likely predict that nanotechnology would invoke a signiﬁcant regulatory reaction, in that it is novel and suggests potentially
catastrophic consequences. But the populist account fails to recognize that only some members of the community will be sensitive to these
concerns. Concerns about catastrophe, in particular, are likely more closely associated with
communitarian-egalitarians, who worry deeply
about the potential destruction of communities,
at least as much as they worry about threats to
individuals.
This nuanced approach to understanding
how people think about environmental risk
accounts for how sophisticated environmental
groups often try to convey their messages.
Environmental groups commonly tout simple
aphorisms about how to think about complex
environmental issues. For example, Leopold’s
assertion that “a thing is right when it tends to
preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of
the biotic community [and] it is wrong when it
tends otherwise” (Leopold 1949, p. 262) neatly
converts the communitarian-egalitarian mindset that most environmental groups hold into
a simple heuristic for how to think about any
environmental issue. Similarly, the idea that
one should worry about environmental impacts
that will be felt seven generations hence does
the same. Expressions such as “the polluter pays
principle,” or even “sustainable development”
and the “precautionary principle,” can also
guide thinking in ways that are amenable to a
particular mindset. Such thinking is commonly

www.annualreviews.org • Law, Environment, and the “Nondismal” Social Sciences

191

ARI

5 October 2012

8:43

denigrated by individualist-hierarchs precisely
because it leads to policy prescriptions that undermine their way of thinking about the world.
For their part, individualist-hierarchs are drawn
to approaches, such as free-market environmentalism, that offer complementary cognitive
reinforcement (Anderson & Leal 1991).
To be sure, recognition of the inﬂuence
of cultural cognition does not wholly preclude democratic resolution of environmental
problems. Kahan (2007) suggests that common
ground can sometimes be obtained by reconstructing the social meaning that people attach
to a public issue. For example, individualisthierarchs might become more amenable to
concerns about climate change when they
are described as threats to international order or as potentially requiring military action.
The concerns about social disturbance obviously resonate with the hierarchs, as would a
military dimension to the problem. Furthermore, market-based programs to address climate change, such as cap-and-trade programs,
can also be more amenable to people who harbor an individualist-hierarchic mindset.
Taken together, these three approaches to
environmental risk suggest that understanding
environmental law and regulation requires an
awareness of how people think about environmental risks. The idea that the environment
ought to be governed largely by unidimensional
attention to efﬁciency lacks widespread support. Instead, people use simple but rich mental strategies for understanding environmental
risks. These mental strategies are not uniform,
as the technocrats might suppose. Nor does
postulating an elaborate array of factors capture
exactly how the public approaches risk. Rather,
people embrace mental strategies for thinking
about risk that suit who they are, what they believe, and how they see themselves and their
society.
Conventional economic approaches thus
mask important ways that the public thinks
about the environment. Although people embrace simple ways of thinking about environmental problems, they do not choose their
mental shortcuts arbitrarily. People embrace
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ways of thinking about environmental risk that
are meaningful to them and that reﬂect how
they believe society ought to look. This reality does not mean that environmental issues
are inherently intractable. It suggests that efforts to understand environmental regulation
in a democratic society must address the meaning that people attach to threats and responses,
rather than treat them exclusively in narrow
risk-beneﬁt terms.

KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION
If the conventional economic understanding of
environmental law misses important elements
of a thicker, more nuanced account of human
cognition and decision making, it also lacks an
appreciation for the distinctive knowledge practices that dominant approaches to environmental law and policy making employ in deﬁning,
organizing, and managing environmental problems. Too often, the economic approach to environmental law tends to naturalize the problems targeted for regulation, assuming that the
underlying facts “simply arrive” fully formed at
the doorsteps of policy making and regulatory
design (Kysar 2010, p. 72), preﬁtted for insertion into the familiar framework of externalities, commons problems, and other forms of
market failure. Such an approach has saved environmental law from a great deal of epistemological difﬁculty, while underwriting a complex
and expensive machinery for generating knowledge about the choices involved in protecting
human health and the environment.
The results, whether measured in the sheer
growth of the ﬁeld, the complexity of its multilayered perceptual and rule-making apparatus,
or the sophistication of its analytical toolkit, are
impressive. Notwithstanding diagnoses of the
“graying” of US environmental law (Lazarus
2004, p. 251 ff.) or increasingly frequent calls
for reinvention in the face of new challenges
(e.g., Flournoy & Driesen 2010), there is little
question that environmental law has achieved
a great deal without having to seriously engage
with its own epistemic virtues and vices. But
at what cost? What has been lost or, more
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precisely, never fully grasped as a result of
this lack of epistemological self-reﬂection? Put
another way, what would a more sustained
engagement with environmental law’s ways
of knowing tell us about the ﬁeld, about
the conditions of possibility for remaking
environmental law, and about ourselves and
our relationships to each other and the earth?
Such questions, one might argue, are best
left to philosophers or intellectual historians
rather than environmental lawyers, disinclined
as they are to engage in theoretical and methodological introspection and preoccupied, in any
event, with the pressing need to get on with
the hard work of environmental protection.
Perhaps. This section argues, however, that
any mature theory of environmental law and
any adequate approach to environmental policy must engage directly with the theories, concepts, and tools—what we refer to as knowledge practices—that shape the subject matter of
the ﬁeld (Boyd 2010b, Kysar 2010). This is not
simply a question of unmasking hidden ideological effects or political agendas. Rather, such
a perspective seeks to go beyond (or beneath)
politics to uncover some of the unrecognized
assumptions and epistemological precommitments [similar in some ways to what Bourdieu
(1977, p. 164 ff.) called the “doxa”] of dominant
approaches to environmental regulation. By
asking how speciﬁc knowledge practices shape
and inform the ﬁeld and by taking the process
of knowledge generation itself as a subject of
inquiry, new possibilities emerge for evaluating and expanding both positive and normative
understandings of environmental law.
To be sure, the general critique of technocratic forms of decision making has been a
recurring (if recessive) theme in environmental
law scholarship for more than 30 years and, of
course, draws upon much older philosophical
and sociological critiques of instrumental
reason (Horkheimer & Adorno 1969, Weber
1978). Writing in the early 1970s, Tribe
pointed to the reductionist tendencies of the
then emerging policy sciences and the resulting
pathologies for ﬁelds such as environmental law
(Tribe 1972, 1973, 1974). In seeking to uncover

the ways in which “particular modes of analysis
in a number of different ﬁelds—particular approaches to formulating questions, organizing
information, and developing answers—entail
fundamental (if often unwitting) commitments
to substantive conclusions shaped in characteristic and often unfortunate ways” (Tribe 1972,
p. 76), Tribe showed how then-emerging
welfarist approaches to environmental law and
policy could be understood and engaged with
only if situated within the larger framework of
instrumental reason and an overarching value
system of liberal individualism (Tribe 1974,
pp. 1331–32).
Writing at the same time, Ackerman and
colleagues used the case of water pollution control efforts on the Delaware River to explore
“the uncertain intellectual foundations” of US
environmental policy and the limits of “technocratic intelligence” (Ackerman et al. 1974, p. 5).
Exploring how the “pollution problem” plaguing the river was reduced and made “susceptible
to quantiﬁcation,” the authors unmasked the
selective rendering of “facts” that underlay
speciﬁc policy choices and the concomitant
inability to ask “more fundamental questions”
regarding long-term environmental quality
(Ackerman et al. 1974, p. 28). In doing so,
Ackerman and colleagues provided the basis
for a broader critique of the reductionist
logic driving technocratic decision making
and the seemingly inevitable policy failures
that ensued as such intelligence came to be
embedded within the bureaucratic routines of
the administrative state.
Although these early efforts to engage with
environmental law’s distinctive ways of knowing largely gave way to debates over instrument
choice and regulatory design, various scholars
(inside and outside of law) have continued to
investigate some of the knowledge practices
that structure the ﬁeld. Thus, the literature
on epistemic communities has provided a basis
for investigating how scientiﬁc experts and
policy elites frame and legitimate approaches
to complex problem areas such as stratospheric
ozone depletion, highlighting the social basis
of scientiﬁc knowledge and the importance of
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particular forms and pedigrees of expertise in
translating that knowledge into policy consensus (Haas 1992; see also Clark et al. 2001, Social
Learning Group 2001). Legal scholars have
also investigated the manner in which speciﬁc
concepts from ecology, such as the balance
of nature, have shaped environmental law
(Scheiber 1997, Tarlock 1994, Wiener 1995),
resonating with earlier work by environmental
and other historians (Hays 1959, McEvoy 1986,
Worster 1977) and with more recent efforts
to distill broad patterns in American thinking
about the environment—our collective “ideas
of nature” (Williams 1980, pp. 67–85)—as part
of a project aimed at reimagining the political
history of US conservation and environmental
protection (Purdy 2010).
Of course, there has also been a great deal
of research over the past several decades on the
general role of science in environmental law and
policy. From Jasanoff ’s pioneering work on the
features of regulatory science ( Jasanoff 1995)
and the inﬂuence of scientiﬁc advisors in the
policy process ( Jasanoff 1990) to the extensive
treatment of scientiﬁc uncertainty in particular environmental controversies—from alar to
arsenic to benzene to global climate change—
the use and abuse of science in various legal
contexts has been a perennial topic of interest
(Gelpe & Tarlock 1974, Latin 1988, Wagner
1995, Wagner & Steinzor 2006). And there is
now a growing body of scholarship that seeks to
evaluate the ways in which ideas and framings
from neoclassical and welfare economics have
shaped environmental law (Kysar 2003, 2010;
Driesen 2010).
Although this admittedly cursory review has
surely left out other important contributions,
the intent is to emphasize the already existing
diverse body of scholarship that touches in one
way or another on the knowledge practices of
environmental law. By bringing this work into
more systematic engagement with the broad,
multidisciplinary ﬁelds of science and technology studies (STS) and history and philosophy
of science [ﬁelds that have already engaged in
various ways with law (see, e.g., Burnett 2007,
Caudill & LaRue 2006, Golan 2004, Jasanoff
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2008, Mnookin 2007, Riles 2011) and with
nature and the environment (for a review, see
Yearley 2008)], this review seeks to further
expand emerging areas of research that build
upon existing scholarship in a manner that
takes the knowledge practices of environmental
law as a topic of inquiry worthy in its own
right. Doing so, it is argued, provides not only
a means for exploring how patterns of thought
have structured environmental law but also a
deeper understanding of what it is precisely that
environmental law claims to know and how the
ﬁeld can better equip itself to deal with increasingly complex and unpredictable challenges.
Starting with the widely accepted proposition that scientiﬁc knowledge represents rather
than mirrors the reality of nature—that it
does not proceed as the cumulative march
of progress as traditional histories of science
suggest—shifts attention from the narrow question of what is to be done given the facts at hand
to a consideration of the ways in which particular understandings of the world gain stability
and authority, thereby highlighting the contingent, social basis of knowledge (Kuhn 1962,
Rorty 1979, Shapin 1994). Contingency here
refers not only to the Kuhnian sense of being
always subject to redescription, revision, and
occasional wholesale abandonment by expert
communities but also to the more constructivist
sense that the production of knowledge occurs
within social, economic, and cultural contexts
that can be subjected to self-conscious determination by the broader political community.
At a more granular level, recognizing that the
making of scientiﬁc and technical knowledge
is messy and situated—that is, carried out by
real people working in particular places under
particular constraints—denaturalizes the production of expert knowledges and directs attention to the various actors and the larger networks of people, practices, technologies, and
institutions that generate speciﬁc knowledge
claims and endow them with authority (Latour
& Woolgar 1986; Shapin 1994, p. xix). Likewise, approaching styles of reasoning and the
concepts and facts that underwrite them as historically constituted opens up a whole set of
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previously unexplored questions regarding how
knowledge comes to be organized in particular ways at particular times and the effects that
such knowledge practices have in shaping views
of the world and concomitant modes of governing (Daston 1991, Hacking 2002, Poovey
1998). Finally, the insight that knowledge production and governance are coconstitutive emphasizes not only the manner in which regimes
of truth come to be embedded within particular approaches to government (Foucault 1991,
Rose et al. 2006) but also the conditions of
possibility for more and deeper engagement
by communities and individuals in the process
of knowledge generation ( Jasanoff 2003, 2004;
Miller 2005).
Although such insights may seem out of
place to mainstream welfarist understandings
of environmental law, it is precisely their
destabilizing effects that generate new lines
of inquiry and expanded opportunities for
reﬂection on the ﬁeld. Taking the knowledge
practices of environmental law as a distinct
subject of inquiry, in other words, provides a
fresh perspective on how particular problems
and facts are fashioned into viable objects of
governance; how new forms of calculability
and quantiﬁcation [new “technologies of
visibility” to use Miller’s (2005, pp. 425–26)
phrase] underwrite particular approaches to
governance; how speciﬁc policy instruments
depend on a whole range of technical and
epistemic practices that are too often invisible;
and how all of these knowledge practices have
deep and unavoidable normative implications,
valorizing certain views and approaches while
marginalizing and erasing others.
Asking how the problems that environmental law targets for regulation are fashioned
into objects of governance, for example, opens
up an expansive set of questions regarding
the manner in which various phenomena are
made amenable to particular approaches to
governance, the role of various communities
in establishing and reproducing the knowledge
forms that underwrite understandings of speciﬁc problems, and the forgettings and erasures
entailed by certain ways of thinking (Boyd

2010b). The problem of global climate change,
to take perhaps the most obvious example,
emerged as a widely accepted scientiﬁc fact
in the 1980s and as a corresponding object of
international environmental concern on the
basis of a particular kind of thinking about the
earth as a single integrated system; a particular
set of knowledge practices and infrastructures,
including most prominently global circulation
models and an extensive worldwide monitoring
and data collection network; and a large and
growing transnational community of experts
gathered under the umbrella of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
and other bodies (Edwards 2010). Together,
these knowledge practices have provided a very
robust set of capabilities for generating “facts
on a planetary scale,” allowing the climate
system to be approached as a single ontological
whole (Edwards 2010; Jasanoff 2004, p. 45).
Far from undermining the claims of climate
science, unpacking knowledge practices in this
manner allows us to see just how powerful the
scientiﬁc and technical infrastructure is that
generates our knowledge of global climate
change, while providing a fuller appreciation
for the difﬁculties confronting environmental
decision making in the face of uncertainty.
From this perspective, climate change is not
reducible to the standard law and economics
framing of commons problems and collective
action; rather, it is a problem that disrupts prior
senses of space, time, and community and calls
forth, indeed demands, new thinking about
governance and the conditions for integrating
highly technical, globalized forms of knowledge
with lived experience ( Jasanoff 2010). Similar
stories could be told for other environmental
problems, from stratospheric ozone depletion
to biodiversity loss, tropical deforestation, or
persistent organic pollutants, all of which have
emerged as coherent objects of governance
based on an elaborate set of knowledge practices that allowed the underlying phenomena to
be understood and formatted in particular ways.
Likewise, the tools and techniques that environmental law uses to generate its working knowledges—from dose-response curves to
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monitoring systems to simulation models to
cost-beneﬁt analyses—contain within them a
set of assumptions about the world and, quite
often, implicit politics that are too often ignored
or taken for granted (Winner 1980). Opening
up the black boxes of these tools and techniques
elucidates the process of knowledge generation,
providing insight into the possibilities, but also
the limits, of employing particular tools as a
basis for environmental decision making. Costbeneﬁt analysis, for example, emerged in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
as a tool for insulating the evaluation of public works projects such as roads and dams from
political pressures (Porter 1995, pp. 148–89).
By the second half of the twentieth century, under the inﬂuence of the new welfare economics,
it had extended its reach into various areas of
the administrative state, emerging along with
other forms of quantiﬁcation as a key “technology of distance” directed at solving problems
of trust and accountability for government bureaucrats and becoming one of the most important decision-making frameworks for regulations aimed at protecting human health and
the environment (Porter 1995, pp. ix, 186–89).
In the process, a logic of optimization applied
to public expenditures on infrastructure came to
provide a seemingly objective way to determine
how many deaths were justiﬁed or how much
environmental destruction was acceptable for
a given level of regulation, displacing in quite
dramatic ways alternative approaches to environmental regulation premised on responsibility and precaution (Kysar 2010).
Other tools, such as modeling and simulation, although less overt in terms of direct
impact on environmental decision making,
have come to exercise similar levels of inﬂuence
on environmental regulation—a fact that has
not escaped environmental law scholars (Farber
2008, Fine & Owen 2005, Wagner et al. 2010),
but one that has only recently begun to be
investigated systematically to understand the
distinctive kinds of knowledge claims made
possible by these tools and their implications
for law and policy. By providing ways of seeing
“systems that are too large, too complex, or
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too far away to study by other means” (Oreskes
2000, pp. 70–71), by “replicating the world in
a machine” as Edwards puts it in reference to
climate models (Edwards 2010, p. 139), modeling allows us to see new problems in new ways,
opening up vast new frontiers of knowledge
and new possibilities for governance. Like
the challenges involved in making “inferences
from the unseen” confronting Justice Holmes
and his colleagues more than a century ago
in Missouri v. Illinois (1906), the new anticipatory knowledges made possible by predictive
models (and other related techniques such
as forecasting, scenario building, and threat
assessment) confront environmental decision
making, both expert and lay, with a host of
epistemic and political challenges (Nelson et al.
2008). Indeed, although predictive models
operate as “a surrogate for access to the future,”
it is often difﬁcult to evaluate “how good a
surrogate they are” (Oreskes 2000, p. 79). How,
for example, should we evaluate the predictions
of repository behavior at Yucca Mountain (or
some other place) one million years in the
future (Oreskes 2000, p. 79; cf. Nuclear Energy
Institute v. EPA 2004)? Moreover, the technical
sophistication associated with modeling “may
propagate the illusion that things are better
known than they really are” (Oreskes 2000,
p. 79). Viewed as “tools and heuristics” by the
modeling community, models are sometimes
perceived and presented as truth machines
by the policy community—a result that can
work to disempower publics and the broader
political community, while providing fodder to
critics who are quick to point to overreaching
by those in favor of taking action on complex
problems marked by signiﬁcant uncertainty
( Jasanoff & Wynne 1998, p. 62; Wagner et al.
2010). Wrestling with the knowledge claims
made possible by these modeling practices
rather than taking them at face value provides a
much ﬁrmer footing for efforts to enhance sustained and meaningful public engagement in
the process of environmental decision making.
Like the tools and techniques that underwrite environmental law’s ways of knowing, the
concepts that animate particular approaches to
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certain problem domains often carry with them
a durable set of precommitments about what
counts as knowledge about the world. The concept of ecosystem services, for example, rests on
a simple stock-ﬂow model of ecological systems
(comprised of an identiﬁed stock of “natural
capital” and the ﬂows of environmental services
that it produces) that translates almost seamlessly into market-based approaches (GómezBaggethun et al. 2010, Norgaard 2010). The
improved policy ﬁt that comes with such an
approach thus needs to be considered against
an impaired ability to see and understand the
complexity and interconnectedness of ecological systems and, more ambitiously, to cultivate
less anthropocentric approaches to the value
of nature (Norgaard 2010, Tribe 1974). Similarly, the concept of risk, which has become
so central to environmental law, is obviously
made possible by and deeply committed to an
actuarial view of the world oriented to populations, distributions, and averages—a world
that has no place for lives in their uniqueness
or for anything but the roughest sense of corrective justice (Hacking 1990, Gigerenzer et al.
1989, Simon 1988). None of which is intended
to take away from the power and utility of such
concepts for environmental law or for broader
problems of social order in a complex, industrial society. Rather, the point is to recognize
the limits entailed in the deployment of such
concepts and to bring into focus what is lost in
the process.
As with the problems, tools, and concepts of
environmental law, the higher-level principles
and norms that serve to organize approaches to
the ﬁeld and that so often provide the terrain
on which normative debate occurs are ripe
for more sustained interrogation in a manner
that incorporates insights and approaches from
STS and the history and philosophy of science.
But instead of engaging in yet another round
of deconstruction and critique—whether of
efﬁciency, precaution, or corrective justice—
focusing on the historically situated knowledge
practices that give rise to, shape, and sustain
these principles and norms provides a basis for
investigating how they get traction in particular

circumstances and how they gather normative
momentum as they mutate and migrate across
the ﬁeld and through various communities.
Such a perspective also provides a way of
thinking about other, less obvious background
principles and norms that allow environmental
law to do its work. The principle of objectivity,
for example, which is fundamental to the
technocratic approach to environmental decision making (Kysar 2010), has deep historical
roots, with different meanings and different
applications depending on context (Daston
1992, Daston & Galison 2007, Porter 1995).
By recognizing this, we can begin to parse the
uses and abuses of objectivity in the context
of environmental regulation, but in a manner
that need not write it off as antithetical to any
particular normative grounding for environmental law. Instead, by viewing objectivity as
an “epistemic virtue” for guiding inquiry and
decision making in particular contexts rather
than as a universal standard of rationality
(Daston & Galison 2007, pp. 39–42), we can
more easily recognize what is at stake in speciﬁc
claims to objectivity and their deployment in
particular approaches to environmental law.
Finally, the various policy instruments
deployed by environmental law, premised as
they are on particular ways of understanding
problems and making use of speciﬁc concepts,
tools, and techniques, would also beneﬁt from
more sustained engagement with STS. In addition to the more abstract arguments regarding
market-based approaches to pollution control
that have become a staple of the environmental
law literature, for example, signiﬁcant work on
the technical and material aspects of market
instruments reveals the importance of “taking
on the technicalities” (Riles 2005, p. 973) to
understand the technologies and infrastructures needed to build and sustain these markets
(Boyd 2010b; Callon 2009; Levin & Espeland
2002; MacKenzie 2009a,b). Such an approach
resonates with existing legal scholarship on
the problems of fungibility in environmental
trading markets and the challenges involved
in developing currencies that facilitate trading, while serving as effective proxies for
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environmental quality (Rose 2008, Salzman
& Ruhl 2000). Bringing these two literatures
into more sustained conversation promises to
provide a richer understanding of the technical
challenges involved in regulatory design
and the limits involved in applying speciﬁc
instruments to certain kinds of problems.
All of these examples point to new and, in
some cases, renewed directions for the positive
theory of environmental law, understood here
as the theory of how environmental law does
its work, while providing a way of situating the
welfarist approach to environmental problems
and investigating its undeniable performative
role in structuring so much of contemporary
environmental regulation. But these perspectives also open up and reinforce an important set
of normative questions. As scholars from various ﬁelds have pointed out, the very act of rendering something technical—of making it legible (Scott 1998)—is a way of depoliticizing it,
taking it out of the world of social institutions
and normative communities and making it the
domain of expertise (Ferguson 1994, Li 2007,
Mitchell 2002, Rose 1999; see also Kennedy
2008, Koskenneimi 2007). In the environmental law context, to take one example, the logic
of optimization embedded within cost-beneﬁt
analysis marginalizes and even erases crucial
questions of ethics and responsibility that were
once at the heart of environmental law (Kysar
2010, Tribe 1974). Recognizing the normative
valences of particular knowledge practices thus
provides another way into the project of reconstructing environmental law in a manner
that seeks to open up the process of knowledge
generation to more and deeper engagement by
individuals and broader political communities
( Jasanoff 2003, 2004; Kysar 2010; Miller 2005).
By historicizing and contextualizing the
knowledge practices that inform environmental
law, systematic attention to the ﬁeld’s distinctive ways of knowing works to denaturalize
the facts and problems that environmental law
so often takes as pregiven and to situate them
within a larger set of positive and normative
concerns. Such an approach, it bears emphasizing, should not be conﬂated with any sort of
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call to relativism or endless critique (cf. Latour
2004). Efforts to historicize and contextualize
knowledge production are hardly tantamount
to a claim that any particular knowledge
practice lacks epistemological validity—a point
that is as true for environmental law as it is
for special relativity theory (Daston 2009,
pp. 812–13). Pragmatist theories of knowledge
long ago abandoned the search for foundations
in favor of a more workmanlike approach to
knowledge—an approach that underscores the
importance of understanding how particular
knowledge practices come to be useful in
particular contexts and, more importantly,
how they get deployed by various political
communities in making environmental futures.

GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
In light of the sheer scale and intensity of human
activity on the planet, many scientists contend
that we have entered a new geological epoch,
the Anthropocene, with consequent inability to
draw reliable predictions from past experience.
As the previous sections made clear, this view is
a product of psychological processes, political
and cultural commitments, academic customs,
technological developments, and other socially
contextual factors. Both science and economics
are sometimes depicted as resting on a set of
neutral methodological principles that shield
the disciplines from the inﬂuence of partisanship and ideology. This is, of course, only an
ideal. Like all human individuals, scientists and
economists harbor partisan beliefs that can determine what they study, how they study it, and
what conclusions they draw from the evidence
they gather. When addressing highly political
issues at the edge of collective understanding,
they are also inﬂuenced by their ideological
beliefs and cultural commitments in ways that
can affect the recommendations they make to
regulators. This is not intended to suggest that
experts, policy makers, and citizens do not face
natural realities or that the social embeddedness
of knowledge practices inevitably renders them
unreliable or somehow dispensable. Rather,
it suggests only that experts work within a
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particular social structure that inﬂuences
their work and methods. At least in some instances, that structure should itself be studied,
understood, and subjected to policy inﬂuence.
At the same time, knowledges also must be
attended to on their own terms, particularly
when they indicate that the natural reality faced
by humanity will pose grave challenges to wellbeing in the future. This section addresses one
particular challenge to environmental law and
policy suggested by the contemporary environmental sciences: the observation that environmental processes operate in ignorance of legal
boundaries, even those lines of national jurisdiction that ﬁgure prominently in the formal
allocation of world power and authority. This
is true most obviously for so-called earth system
processes (Rockström et al. 2009). Certain dynamics and resources—such as the ozone layer,
ocean currents, the nitrogen and phosphorous
cycles, biodiversity, deforestation, desertiﬁcation, deep sea ﬁsheries, and persistent toxic
pollutants—appear to literally span the entire
globe in reach and/or impact and thus seem
to require signiﬁcant multilateral engagement
from nations of the world to be successfully
managed (Dietz et al. 2003). Even those environmental and natural resource issues thought
to be more local in scope increasingly are being recognized as deeply impacted by activities and decisions undertaken abroad (Kysar &
Li 2008). Ambient air quality in the Western
United States, for instance, appears to be signiﬁcantly affected by pollutant emissions from
Asia, such that the ability to achieve domestic air
quality standards depends on choices made by
other governments halfway around the world.
Similarly, in the future hardly any environmental or natural resource issue may be amenable to
adequate characterization without considering
the effects of climate change, which is a global
public goods problem par excellence. In short,
to fully understand and evaluate environmental
law, one must be prepared to incorporate the
subject’s inevitable supranational dimensions.
Economic approaches to environmental
law face a conceptual challenge in this respect,
as they are generally premised on a welfarist

framework in which an assumption has already
been made regarding who counts for purposes
of welfare calculation. Cost-beneﬁt analyses of
national environmental policies, for instance,
typically only tabulate domestic impacts of
regulation (Posner 2007, Zerbe 1991). In
some instances, however, the most important
question posed by an environmental issue will
be whether and to what extent foreign impacts
should be considered by a regulating body.
Likewise, cost-beneﬁt analyses typically model
foreign contributions to environmental problems as ﬁxed inputs, rather than as factors that
might themselves become subjects of policy
inﬂuence. Even a recent US Interagency Task
Force Report on the Social Costs of Carbon—
which offered a signiﬁcant methodological
advance by expressly incorporating the wellbeing of individuals living outside of the United
States when calculating the welfare losses
associated with greenhouse gas emissions—
remained anchored to a rigid account of
foreign state behavior. Speciﬁcally, all three of
the integrated assessment models relied upon
by the Task Force were built on assumptions
about the growth of greenhouse gas emissions
in other countries that remained independent
of US policy. In other words, no action taken
by the United States to arrest its own emissions
could spark policy changes in other countries
within the models, no matter how signiﬁcant
the US step taken. As a result, the beneﬁt to
changing US climate policy may be signiﬁcantly understated: Almost without exception,
knowledgeable observers report that the US
position against serious greenhouse gas regulation has been a fundamental stumbling block
for international climate negotiations during
the past two decades. Because the positive international impact of removing that stumbling
block cannot be recognized and credited by
the US social cost of carbon measure, however,
it becomes less likely that the stumbling block
will actually be removed (Kysar 2011).
The implicit worldview of such models is an
atomized one that borrows much from the realist tradition in international relations theory
(Waltz 1979). States are presumed to care only

www.annualreviews.org • Law, Environment, and the “Nondismal” Social Sciences

199

ARI

5 October 2012

8:43

about maximizing their own interests, such that
international law and international relations
are seen merely as spaces within which rationally motivated competition and coordination
occurs, rather than as forums for discussion and
mutual social inﬂuence (Goldsmith & Posner
2005, Posner 2009). International law seen
from this vantage point does not represent real
law, in the sense of embodying a set of values
and expectations that the law’s subjects accept
as legitimate reﬂections of, or even constitutive
elements of, their community. Accordingly, as
Goldsmith and Posner put it, “nations have no
moral obligation to comply with international
law” (Goldsmith & Posner 2006, p. 463). Instead, states simply have a duty to deploy international law in a manner strategically calculated
to maximize state self-interest. Treaties and
other international agreements, by “providing
a focal point for coordination, and establishing
what counts as cooperation in a prisoner’s
dilemma” (Goldsmith & Posner 2006, p. 466),
do little more than temporarily and unstably
suspend otherwise endemic rivalries between
states. From this vantage point, even widely
embraced international agreements may not
solve collective action problems given that
the likelihood of state shirking and consensus
breakdown is thought to increase as the number of parties to a treaty expands (Goldsmith
& Posner 2006, p. 469). Thus, the rationalist
approach to international ordering reintroduces the collective action problem at the very
moment that international law appears to be
succeeding. The upshot of these theoretical
claims is blunt: “Given the multiple conﬂicting
interests of states on various issues, and the particular distribution of state power with respect
to those issues, many global problems are unsolvable” (Goldsmith & Posner 2006, p. 468).
Two features of the rationalist approach
merit particular scrutiny: the undertheorized
role of state interest and the focus on the state
as the dominant unit of analysis. First, the rationalist approach says very little about how
states decide what is and is not in their interest, a gap that in the extreme threatens to
render such approaches tautological (Chayes &
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Chayes 1993). Generally, states are expected to
maximize their citizens’ well-being as deﬁned
in materialist terms and as shaped by the states’
internal political economies, but these concepts
seem malleable enough to account for most any
outcome. Moreover, on the rationalist account,
little possibility exists for the process of international lawmaking to inﬂuence what states and
their citizens perceive to be in their interest. Important schools of thought reject this exogenous
conception, including even some within the rationalist tradition (Abbott 1989, Slaughter et al.
1998). For instance, rather than a simple game
theoretic exercise with limited and clearly deﬁned payoffs, international negotiations might
be seen as more open-ended interactions in
which a wider range of interests can be balanced
through side payments and other ﬂexible mechanisms (Barrett 2010, Parson & Zeckhauser
1995, Susskind 1994). Introducing reputation
as an important component of state interest
might similarly expand the range of situations in
which international cooperation appears attractive, even on a rational-maximization account
(Guzman 2008). More dramatically, all parties
to a treaty might subject themselves to shifting
and unpredictable perceptions of state interest
by committing to scientiﬁcally investigate the
severity and potential impact of an environmental problem and to base policies substantially
on the results of those investigations (Parson
1998). The widespread success of the international ozone treaty regime has been attributed
to this kind of willingness by parties to precommit to scientiﬁcally inﬂuenced policy (Parson
2003; see also Canan & Reichman 2001), in
addition to materialist explanations hinging on
the market interest of US corporations.
Various liberal schools of international
relations theory extend this approach through
careful focus on international institutions and
the possibilities they hold for inﬂuencing the
preferences and behaviors of states (Downie
2010). For instance, international environmental institutions may help to elevate issues
to a level of national concern, strengthen
capacity within lesser-developed nations, and
structure and enhance the space within which
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negotiations take place (Haas et al. 1993).
International environmental law is a particularly fruitful area for the liberal institutionalist
approach given that environmental problems
typically necessitate the creation of administrative bodies to implement and enforce treaty
obligations and to monitor environmental quality over extended periods of time. One estimate
places the number of international environmental institutions created in recent decades
at more than 200 (Biermann & Pattberg
2008, p. 281). Whereas realists would see such
institutions as merely epiphenomenal of state
interest, liberals regard the number, complexity, and durability of such institutions to be
implausibly explained by state interest alone
(Raustiala & Slaughter 2002). At the least, the
proliferation of agreements and regimes within
the fragmented system of international law
gives rise to the possibility of conﬂict among
them, exempliﬁed most starkly by the different
approaches taken by the World Trade Organization and the Convention on Biodiversity
toward the regulation of genetically modiﬁed
organisms (Pollack & Shaffer 2009, Raustiala &
Victor 2004). Such alternative regimes allowed
for competing policies and, indeed, competing
normative frameworks to persist despite seemingly compelling reasons for major players,
such as the United States and the European
Union, to achieve a harmonized result.
An important extension of the liberal school
of international relations is Koh’s theory of
transnational legal process (Koh 1997; Koh
1998a,b), which focuses attention on the
variety of actors and fora through which global
norms are debated, interpreted, and ultimately
adopted by states. Koh’s approach, with its
focus on the institutions through which state
power is inﬂuenced and performed and on the
discourses through which global norms are articulated and contested, can be seen as a bridge
between liberal and constructivist schools of international relations theory. The latter school
goes even further away from the materialist
focus of realists than liberal institutionalists,
positing “(1) that the structures of human
association are determined primarily by shared

ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that
the identities and interests of purposive actors
are constructed by these shared ideas rather
than given by nature” (Wendt 1999, p. 1; see
also Ruggie 1998). Constructivist approaches
aim to open the black box of state interest,
analyzing the social and ideational processes by
which norms and values come to be accepted
and adhered to by an actor (Checkel 2008). In
the extreme case, the very subjective identity of
an actor is said to be a product—a construct—
of the discourses and knowledge schemes that
permeate the actor’s social world. Even without
going to that idealist extreme, processes of
socialization and acculturation seem capable
of leading states to positions and behaviors
that they might reject through interest-based
decision making (Goodman & Jinks 2004). A
recent working paper, for instance, uses international socialization theory to explain China’s
unexpected decision to commit to signiﬁcant
reductions in the greenhouse gas intensity
of its economy, a move that, at a minimum,
raises questions about the adequacy of explanations based on purely instrumental grounds
(Williams 2010). Constructivist insights also
shed light on the choice of “hard” and “soft”
versions of multilateral agreements (Shaffer &
Pollack 2010), which is especially important in
the environmental arena given extensive historical use of soft agreements as a supposed gateway to norm internalization and, eventually,
more signiﬁcant environmental commitments.
If assumptions about the socialization process
underlying this approach are ill-founded, then
the constructivist school may be able to both
diagnose and improve the situation.
These alternative theoretical approaches
dovetail with a tradition in US environmental
law of viewing states intersubjectively, as
entities that are capable of reasoning with
one another toward shared goals. The United
Nations Environment Program Participation
Act of 1973, for instance, declared that “[i]t is
the policy of the United States to participate
in coordinated international efforts to solve
environmental problems of global and international concern” (Kysar 2010, pp. 124–25).
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Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act
adopted in 1977 began with a congressional
ﬁnding “that the world faces enormous, urgent,
and complex problems, with respect to natural
resources, which require new forms of cooperation between the United States and developing
countries to prevent such problems from becoming unmanageable” (Kysar 2010, p. 125).
In light of these problems, the amendments
directed the President “to provide leadership
both in thoroughly reassessing policies relating
to natural resources and the environment, and
in cooperating extensively with developing
countries in order to achieve environmentally
sound development” (Kysar 2010, p. 125).
Other examples of US efforts to assert international environmental leadership included the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which
instructed the President to take those actions
necessary to ensure that other countries reduce
water pollution even within their own borders,
and the Ocean Dumping Act, which directed
the Secretary of State to promote effective
international cooperation to protect the
marine environment. This mode of national
self-awareness regarding international environmental responsibility was also encouraged
under some US federal court interpretations
of the National Environmental Policy Act and
under a 1979 Carter Administration executive
order, all of which encouraged consideration
of the extraterritorial environmental impact of
major actions by US governmental actors.
More recently, however, the view of foreign
environmental relations as an essentially hostile
and noncommunicative game has tended to
dominate within the United States. It was well
encapsulated in the climate change context by
President George W. Bush’s statement that
“each country needs to recognize that we must
reduce our greenhouse gases. . .to come up
with an effective strategy that, hopefully, when
added together. . .leads to a real reduction,”
a conception that came to dominate international climate negotiations as the Copenhagen
Climate Summit failed to produce a binding
collective agreement (Kysar 2010, p. 143).
Even from the perspective of unbridled state
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self-interest, this atomistic conception seems
unsatisfactory, for it presupposes a vision of
state autonomy and self-sufﬁciency that can no
longer be maintained: Under circumstances
of deep environmental interconnectivity, the
state risks much by choosing to go it alone
and to simply “hope” that other states’ policies
will lead to a sustainable planet “when added
together.” The state instead might proﬁt by
perceiving itself as a subject that stands in
relations of responsibility and dependency
with other signiﬁcant actors on the geopolitical
stage. From that perspective, countries might
pursue unilateral emissions abatement precisely
because they hope to inspire and lead other
states to a new shared perspective on climate
change, believing that perceptions of state interest not only drive international relations but
also can, at least in part, be determined by them.
As the preceding discussion already indicates, international ordering also can be usefully studied and understood by focusing on a
wider array of actors and institutions than simply states, which are the usual focus of rationalist accounts. As Kennedy summarizes:
Any so-called “realism” that attends only to
the overt acts of national sovereigns is no
longer realistic. In our world, power lies in
the capillaries of social and economic life.
Myriad networks of citizens, commercial
interests, civil organisations and government
ofﬁcials are more signiﬁcant than interstate
diplomacy. Statesmen and stateswomen act
against a background fabric of expectations –
the legitimating or delegitimating gaze of
world public opinion – and they act in the
shadow of all manner of public and private
norms (Kennedy 2005, p. 3).

In the environmental realm, important
contributions have followed this advice by,
inter alia, breaking down the state into its
constituent departments through a focus
on the domestic implementation process
(Victor et al. 1998), evaluating how domestic
regulations and institutions affect the ability
of states and other actors to compete in
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international standard-setting arenas (Mattli
& Büthe 2003), examining the surprising inﬂuence of subnational governmental actors on
the global policy stage (Kysar & Meyler 2008),
formalizing the concept of epistemic communities as similarly important policy actors
(Haas 1992), evaluating how the professional
afﬁliation of representatives to international
standard-setting bodies can inﬂuence decision
making (Veggeland & Borgen 2005), and
exploring the phenomenon of transnational
networks of regulatory ofﬁcials that arguably
“have become fully formed alternatives to the
new international tribunals that increasingly
meant to give form and content to international
legal regimes” (Zaring 2009, p. 212; see also
Slaughter 2004). These various strands of
inquiry resonate well with the emerging legal
literature on “global environmental law” (Yang
& Percival 2009), a ﬁeld that “seeks to move
beyond the traditional focus of international
environmental law on the possibilities and limits of consent-based regimes among state actors
and abstract arguments regarding instrument
choice toward a more empirically grounded focus on institutional design and problem solving
that crosses multiple jurisdictional scales and
attends to multiple actors coordinating through
a variety of organizational forms” (Boyd 2010a,
p. 504).
Scholars working under the banner of
global governance studies have fully embraced
this decentering of the state for both positive
and normative reasons: “The move to governance seems broadly to reﬂect the view that
paradigms like ‘regulation’ or the ‘Westphalian’
system in international relations are no longer
capacious enough to generate useful theory or
guide the humane practice of social control”
(Burris et al. 2008, p. 1). From the governance
perspective, problems such as climate change
reveal the inability of conventional frameworks
to adequately grasp twenty-ﬁrst-century threats
and the variety of actors, norms, and institutions that have arisen to address them. Targets
of regulation must be seen as embedded within
intricate social, economic, and ecological
systems that span the globe and defy prediction

or control in a top-down, state-driven manner.
Thus, governance can only emerge within such
systems from the decentralized interventions
of multifarious public and private actors, each
operating at different levels and from different
spheres of authority, utilizing a range of policy
tools both hard and soft and representing
diverse interests and stakeholder groups. Understanding how a governance system arises and
stabilizes in this terrain is far more complicated
than conventional study of international law
(Boyd 2010a). In addition to mapping the ways
in which various global initiatives are worked
and reworked through the vernacular institutions of national and subnational formations
(Sassen 2006), one must be prepared to examine the role of nongovernment organizations
in what one scholar terms world civil politics,
whereby such organizations not only lobby
governments directly to inﬂuence state interest
but also work through transnational networks
to alter norms of appropriate conduct at the
level of individuals and communities (Wapner
1996). Nongovernmental organizations might
even exert a sort of virtual Westphalian power
by allying with weak states and providing
diplomatic services to them during multilateral
negotiations (Spiro 2007). Similarly, the business community must be acknowledged as a
force capable of asserting strong inﬂuence over
the design and impact of governance systems,
both through conventional means of shaping government positions and, increasingly,
through direct engagement with international
institutions and creation of new institutions
and partnerships (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000,
Levy & Newell 2005). Interactions between
these two movements have yielded particularly
interesting developments in the form of private
global governance (O’Neill 2009), including
those processes and norms associated with the
corporate social responsibility movement (Auld
et al. 2008), and with the use of market-based
certiﬁcation and labeling regimes to promote
social and environmental goods (Bartley 2007,
Cashore et al. 2004). The latter example of
nonstate market driven governance has been
an especially signiﬁcant area of study, not only
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because certiﬁcation and labeling schemes
exemplify so much that is of theoretical interest
within governance studies but also because
their practical impact could be quite signiﬁcant:
“Current systems alone operate in sectors that
represent one-ﬁfth of the products traded
globally” (Bernstein & Cashore 2007, p. 348).
Perhaps because its subject matter is plural,
fragmented, and messy, the global governance
literature often feels rather unruly. Increasingly, scholars are ﬁnding ways to synthesize
its ﬁndings and features into more manageable
rubrics. The recursivity framework, for instance, encompasses a politics of global norm
creation, a politics of domestic adoption and
implementation, and a politics of interaction
between the two driven by intermediary actors
(Halliday 2009). A critical advantage of this
integrated framework is that it focuses attention on possible gaps and mismatches between
norms articulated at the global level and capacities of domestic actors expected to implement
them. Burgeoning literatures on the question
of legitimacy in global governance regimes
(Bernstein & Cashore 2007, Bodansky 1999)
and the possibility of global administrative law
(Esty 2006, Kingsbury et al. 2005) also help as
bridging devices by establishing and evaluating
normative criteria for inclusion and participation in global policy-making processes. Not
only are multiple actors and levels of governance being synthesized in this manner but
also multiple modes of inﬂuence. Sophisticated
writers in the global governance literature,
for instance, increasingly adopt an integrated
framework in which realist, liberal institutionalist, and constructivist insights are combined,
recognizing the “importance of the interaction
of social structure with the dynamics of choice”
(Bernstein & Cashore 2007, p. 352). From this
vantage point, a once-contested norm might
over time become sufﬁciently embedded as
to become part of the social structure within
which interest-maximization occurs. Some
form of attention to labor and environmental
conditions upstream in a supply chain, for
instance, appears to have become a relatively
settled aspect of multinational corporate
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citizenship, such that ﬁrm proﬁt-maximization
occurs now under a different, more socially
inﬂected set of constraints.
This section has only hinted at the complexity and signiﬁcance of questions raised by
global governance studies. Continuing interactions within and across disciplines will enrich
the standard set of conceptual tools—actors, interests, and institutions; discourses and norms;
instrument choice, implementation, and enforcement; multiple, overlapping governance
systems; etc.—with still new ways of understanding and assessing global social and ecological change. As discussed in the previous section, the role of knowledge practices in making
such changes legible as global policy issues, for
instance, is an important and underappreciated
one that recently has been added to the legal literature. And social scientists and legal scholars
of various persuasions have started to expand
the literature on global governance by illustrating how legal technologies—such as the value
form devised to incorporate avoided deforestation into emerging carbon markets—hold implications not only for standard questions about
institutional design and regulatory effectiveness
but also for the very nature of sovereignty, territoriality, and community (Boyd 2010a, Sassen
2006). To be sure, the emergence of a multilateral world environmental organization that
successfully tackled climate change and other
globe-spanning problems through top-down
regulatory controls might well turn the tide
back toward more traditional areas of inquiry.
But environmental scholars are advised not to
hold their breath and wait.

CONCLUSION
Rather than abstract or formal truth, the American pragmatist tradition emphasizes usefulness
as the primary test of knowledge’s veracity.
What is useful for environmental law in the
twenty-ﬁrst century is to understand human
cognition and decision making as both thicker
and less stable than rational choice theories
presume, to recognize knowledge production
as something that can itself be studied and
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regulated, and to perceive international policy
coordination as a complex social endeavor that
involves more actors and more interests than a
simple game theoretic contest among states. To
meet these needs environmental lawyers must
explore new knowledges, as the traditionally
dominant ﬁeld of economics seems less useful
on these dimensions than available alternatives.
Our review of “nondismal” social sciences
has offered some fruitful possibilities, but it
has been necessarily brief and selective. In
addition to the ﬁelds discussed above, scholars
and practitioners of environmental law have

much to gain from canvassing such disciplines
as geography, ecological anthropology, environmental sociology, environmental history,
and political ecology, all of which have been
almost entirely neglected by environmental
lawyers but have long been asking foundational
questions about nature/society in ways quite
different from environmental and natural
resource economics. Through these alternative
lenses, the environmental problems of the
twenty-ﬁrst century may appear less wicked
and insoluble, even as they are rendered with
more accuracy and complexity.
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